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BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP AND THE FOURTEENTH 
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I.  THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE AS A FAILURE OF ORIGINAL INTENT 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to override the 
denial of jus soli birthright U.S. citizenship to African Americans in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford1 while at the same time excluding from such 
birthright citizenship all indigenous people who remained members 
of their native tribes.  They struggled but ultimately failed to find 
language that accomplished these two objectives in coherent fashion.  
They sought to limit birthright citizenship to those who could be pre-
sumed to have full allegiance to the United States.  But use of the “al-
legiance” language risked echoing feudal doctrines of perpetual alle-
giance that the American Revolution and American republican 
principles had repudiated.  The language they ultimately employed—
“and subject to the jurisdiction thereof”2—instead sought to focus on 
whether persons were fully and exclusively under the jurisdiction of 
the United States, as persons still living in tribes were not.  But all 
such tribal members were subject to the ultimate jurisdiction of the 
United States, so the effort to exclude them through the phrase “sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof” was a logical failure.  The original in-
tent was sustained in Elk v. Wilkins,3 but without an interpretation that 
could render the clause fully coherent—because there is none. 
More than two decades ago in Citizenship Without Consent, Peter 
Schuck and I argued that the best, if still imperfect, way to bring logi-
cal coherence to the Citizenship Clause consonant with its dual orig-
inal intentions was to draw on the international law writers invoked 
by American jurists and legislators when trying to define the status of 
the native tribes, particularly Emmerich de Vattel and Jean-Jacques 
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 1 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Burlamaqui.4  They tried to render jus soli citizenship consistent with 
citizenship based on the consent of persons to mutual political asso-
ciation through contending that parents should be understood to 
demand the offer of citizenship to their children as a condition of 
their own consent to membership.  Vattel had defined the native tri-
bes as dependent nations who were understood to wish to maintain 
significant, if limited, autonomy.5  Their members therefore could 
not be presumed to seek citizenship for themselves or their children.  
Schuck and I believed that this interpretation of the Citizenship 
Clause best accorded with the conflicting aims of its Framers (to in-
clude African Americans, but exclude Native Americans in tribes), 
with theoretical efforts to make birthright citizenship accord with 
membership via consent, and with the international law traditions 
upon which they drew. 
It nonetheless had difficulties.  To include African Americans and 
children of permanent resident aliens, the Clause had to be inter-
preted not to require everyone to have citizen parents, so long as the 
parents were present on American soil by the consent of the U.S. 
Government.  That interpretation represented a modification of Vat-
tel’s and (arguably) Burlamaqui’s views (however plausible).  And, of 
course, our view also meant that the Clause should not be read as 
conferring birthright citizenship on the children of aliens never le-
gally permitted into the United States.  The choice of their status 
would be left to Congress, as was and is true for Native Americans liv-
ing in tribes, whose citizenship stems from congressional legislation 
enacted in 1924.6  Many, including both of us, have found that impli-
cation politically troubling, and many arguments have been mounted 
against our view.  I would prefer to read the Citizenship Clause as 
consistently embodying an anti-caste, anti-subordination principle as 
Cristina Rodríguez has urged, consistent with interpretations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause that I have long 
favored.7  Yet I cannot escape the conclusion that the framers and 
ratifiers of that Amendment consciously intended to perpetuate the 
 
 4 PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:  ILLEGAL ALIENS 
IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985). 
 5 Chancellor James Kent cited Vattel to define the status of the tribes in this way in an in-
fluential 1823 case decision, Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 693, 711–12 (N.Y. 1823).  Chief 
Justice John Marshall followed this view in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 
52–53 (1831). 
 6 Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 175, 43 Stat. 253. 
 7 Cristina Rodríguez, The Citizenship Clause, Original Meaning, and the Egalitarian Unity of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1363 (2009); Rogers M. Smith, Equal Protection 
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subordination of Native Americans who had not renounced their tri-
bal allegiances, even if they did not intend to subordinate non-white 
immigrants.  And U.S. policies then permitted both Native Americans 
and non-white immigrants to move from their home tribes or nations 
without substantive restrictions, so it is at best difficult to say that they 
meant to extend to those coming to the United States in violation of 
national policies the anti-subordination protection they denied to 
members of the native tribes. 
There are, to be sure, other arguments for interpreting the Citi-
zenship Clause’s intentions inclusively that have force, even if they do 
not seem to me entirely convincing.8  Rather than continue all those 
debates, I contend in the next section that one reply has been streng-
thened by recent developments:  arguments for tacit consent to jus 
soli citizenship for all. 
II.  RECENT DEBATES OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BIRTHRIGHT 
CITIZENSHIP 
A variety of our critics have contended that, regardless of the 
phrasing, history, or original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
there is no difficulty reconciling birthright citizenship for undocu-
mented aliens with ideals that rest citizenship on consent to mutual 
political association.  The reality is that the nineteenth century Su-
preme Court upheld birthright citizenship for children of aliens in 
U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark,9 and it has been accepted with virtual unanimity 
by the American people ever since then, if not before.  As a result, 
the nation can be said to have effectively consented to a reading of 
the Fourteenth Amendment that confers jus soli birthright citizenship 
on children of aliens never legally admitted to the United States. 
When we wrote in 1985, this argument seemed unconvincing for 
two reasons.  First, Wong Kim Ark deals explicitly only with children of 
legally admitted aliens.  The undocumented alien population then 
was much smaller and may well not have seemed significant; at any 
 
 8 See, e.g., Joseph H. Carens, Who Belongs?  Theoretical and Legal Questions About Birthright Citi-
zenship in the United States, 37 U. TORONTO L.J. 413 (1987) (reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK & 
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DIEGO L. REV. 485 (1987) (reviewing same); and for replies, ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC 
IDEALS:  CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 308–10 & nn.56 & 59 
(1997); Peter H. Schuck & Rogers M. Smith, Membership and Consent:  Actual or Mythic?  A 
Reply to David A. Martin, 11 YALE J. INT’L L. 545 (1986). 
 9 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
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rate, the Court gave no attention to the children of such aliens in that 
decision or any later one.  Acceptance of the Wong Kim Ark precedent 
therefore cannot be said to involve explicit acceptance of jus soli citi-
zenship for aliens not legally present in the United States, either by 
the Court or the American public. 
Second, at the time we first discussed the topic, even many schol-
ars of American constitutional law were unaware that the Fourteenth 
Amendment had never been read to provide birthright citizenship to 
children born to members of the native tribes.  Most we encountered 
had not heard of Elk v. Wilkins or assumed it had at some point been 
overruled.  Given this limited knowledge among constitutional ex-
perts, it strained credulity to say that the American people had in any 
real sense ever decided that Fourteenth Amendment birthright citi-
zenship should extend to children of undocumented aliens.  Most 
Americans, even most highly educated Americans, even most Ameri-
cans in academia or in law, were blissfully unaware that there might 
be any issue about it.  There was admittedly lots of unthinking accep-
tance of the status quo, but that did not seem to us a very meaningful 
form of consent. 
That situation has now changed, in part because of our book.  In 
its wake, a number of organizations favoring immigration restriction 
have repeatedly advocated either for congressional legislation deny-
ing birthright citizenship to children of undocumented aliens, or for 
a constitutional amendment to achieve that result, or for both.  Be-
ginning in 1993 and continuing in every congressional session there-
after to the present, Representative Elton Gallegly of Simi Valley, 
California has been particularly energetic in introducing legislation 
to achieve denial of birthright citizenship to illegal alien children by 
either of these routes, sometimes citing our book.10  (Both Schuck 
and I refused to testify on behalf of these measures.)  At the height of 
his power after the 1994 election, Speaker of the House Newt Gin-
grich also endorsed these steps and they appeared in the 1996 Re-
publican Party Platform, which read in part:  “We support a constitu-
tional amendment or constitutionally-valid legislation declaring that 
children born in the United States of parents who are not legally pre-
 
 10 See 139 CONG. REC. 3995 (1993) (statement of Rep. Gallegly) (introducing both a pro-
posed constitutional amendment and a bill limiting citizenship at birth “merely by virtue 
of birth in the United States to persons born of mothers with citizen or legal resident sta-
tus”). Gallegly’s most recent version of the latter legislation was introduced on January 6, 
2009.  H.R. 126, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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sent in the United States or who are not long-term residents are not 
automatically citizens.”11 
These proposals continue to be put forth to this day, backed both 
by advocacy groups and by many members of Congress.  The 109th 
Congress saw seven measures introduced, one in the Senate and six 
in the House, which would in various ways have restricted birthright 
citizenship for children of undocumented aliens.12  In the 110th Con-
gress, one hundred and four Congressmen have co-sponsored the 
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2007, which would legislatively interpret 
the Fourteenth Amendment not to provide citizenship to those born 
to parents not legally present in the United States, beginning after 
the date of the law’s enactment.13 
In sum, since the 1990s, the nation’s legislators and one political 
party have regularly raised and debated the issue of birthright citizen-
ship for undocumented aliens, with strong advocacy for exclusion.  
These efforts have all failed.  Indeed, none has come anywhere close 
to winning congressional approval or broader popular support.  It 
 
 11 AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1996, available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25848. 
 12 See, e.g., End Birth Citizenship to Illegal Aliens Act, H.R. 6294, 109th Cong. (2006) (pro-
posing legislation that all children born in the United States have the same citizenship 
and immigration status as the mother); Engaging the Nation to Fight for Our Right to 
Control Entry (ENFORCE) Act, S. 2177, 109th Cong. § 503 (2005) (proposing to amend 
the Immigration and Nationality Act to limit citizenship to children with at least one par-
ent who is a citizen or lawfully admitted permanent resident); Enforcement First Immi-
gration Act, H.R. 3938, 109th Cong. § 701 (2005) (proposing an amendment to section 
301(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006), so that 
only children born in the United States to a parent who is a “citizen or national of the 
United States” or “an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence” may be 
granted U.S. citizenship); Reducing Immigration to a Genuinely Healthy Total (RIGHT) 
Act, H.R. 3700, 109th Cong. § 201 (2005) (limiting automatic birthright citizen to chil-
dren with at least one parent who is a citizen or permanent resident); H.R.J. Res. 41, 
109th Cong. (2005) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution to provide that no 
person born in the United States will be United States citizen unless a parent is a citizen 
or a lawfully admitted permanent resident at the time of the birth); H.R.J. Res. 46, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (proposing a constitutional amendment to deny United States citizenship 
to individuals born in the United States to parents who are neither United States citizens 
nor persons who owe permanent allegiance to the United States); Citizen Reform Act, 
H.R. 698, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing an amendment to the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act that would deny United States citizenship to children born in the United 
States to parents who are not United States citizesns or permanent resident aliens). 
 13 Birthright Citizenship Act, H.R. 1940, 110th Cong. (2007) (co-sponsor information avail-
able at The Library of Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ 
bdquery/z?d110:HR01940:@@@N).  Two further bills, with very similar goals, have been 
submitted:  The Loophole Elimination and Verification Enforcement (LEAVE) Act, H.R. 
6789, 110th Cong. § 301 (2008); and Optimizing Visa Entry Rules and Demanding Uni-
form Enforcement (OVERDUE) Immigration Reform Act, H.R. 4192, 110th Cong. § 201 
(2007). 
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therefore makes much more sense than it did in 1985 to say that 
Americans have, through their representatives and their votes for 
their representatives, consented to reading the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to provide birthright citizenship to children of all aliens born 
on American soil, whether legally present or not (with the continuing 
exception of children of ambassadors, in accordance with the legal 
fiction that they still reside in their home country).  Many critics of 
our reading of the Fourteenth Amendment will no doubt persist in 
arguing that it was always erroneous for a variety of reasons.  But per-
haps we can all now agree that, insofar as consent to the prevailing 
practice is required for its legitimacy, the case for such consent effec-
tively having been given is now stronger than it once was. 
III.  THE NEW CHALLENGE TO BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP 
The academic debate over birthright citizenship has, however, not 
ended.  Instead, it has recently taken a new and highly significant 
turn.  In a series of articles culminating in her new book, The Birth-
right Lottery, Ayelet Shachar (writing sometimes with Ran Hirschl), has 
called attention to an undeniable reality:  the institution of birthright 
citizenship assigns to a small portion of the world’s population a 
bundle of valuable resources simply due to their places of birth, while 
it consigns literally billions of others to far harsher circumstances due 
to their places of birth.14  For Shachar, it is not the incompatibility of 
birthright citizenship with democratic principles of consensual mem-
bership that is its most disturbing feature.  It is rather its incompati-
bility with egalitarian versions of social justice.  Her argument has 
force.  In a new century marked by rising political and social move-
ments seeking to promote greater global justice and a range of cos-
mopolitan humanitarian concerns, the domestically inclusive and 
egalitarian features of birthright citizenship increasingly seem less 
striking than the externally exclusionary and inegalitarian conse-
quences of the policy. 
Even so, birthright citizenship is inclusive and egalitarian for those 
residing on the territory of a given political community; and it is hard 
to envision an arrangement for assigning civic memberships that 
would be pronouncedly more egalitarian.  Shachar and Hirschl have 
argued for some system of global redistribution of resources to com-
pensate for the unearned advantages of birth into more prosperous 
 
 14 AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY:  CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 
(forthcoming 2009). 
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and peaceful societies, but they recognize that no such proposals are 
likely to be politically feasible in the foreseeable future.15  Just as it is 
plausible to attribute to parents the desire to make their citizenships 
available to their children, we can also expect many parents to feel 
that they have contributed to the relative well-being of their commu-
nities and that they are therefore entitled to pass those advantages on 
to their children—even if the advantages conferred seem clearly to 
outrun anything the parents have contributed to those societies. 
But the main point of Shachar’s work is to spark a debate over 
whether we can defensibly maintain the global status quo in regard to 
birthright citizenship or whether we should seek alternative arrange-
ments, either for conferring civic memberships or for ameliorating 
their unequal consequences or some combination of both.  The re-
sults of such debate cannot be foreseen.  But if the prior debate over 
the desirability of birthright citizenship for undocumented aliens that 
was partly sparked by Citizenship Without Consent is any evidence, 
bringing the issues Shachar is raising into public discussion may well 
prove to have some desirable consequences, even if no radical change 
in the status quo ensues.  At a minimum, the experience of the mod-
ern debate over birthright citizenship in the United States suggests 
that we should not be too fearful of contributing controversial ideas 
to democratic contestation and processes of self-governance. 
 
 15 Ayelet Shachar & Ran Hirschl, Citizenship as Inherited Property, 35 POL. THEORY 253 (2007). 
